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Abstract—SentiNet is a novel detection framework for physical
attacks on neural networks, a class of attacks that constrains
an adversarial region to a visible portion of an image. Physical
attacks have been shown to be robust and flexible techniques
suited for deployment in real-world scenarios. Unlike most other
adversarial detection works, SentiNet does not require training
a model or preknowledge of an attack prior to detection. This
attack-agnostic approach is appealing due to the large number of
possible mechanisms and vectors of attack an attack-specific de-
fense would have to consider. By leveraging the neural network’s
susceptibility to attacks and by using techniques from model
interpretability and object detection as detection mechanisms,
SentiNet turns a weakness of a model into a strength. We demon-
strate the effectiveness of SentiNet on three different attacks—
i.e., adversarial examples, data poisoning attacks, and trojaned
networks—that have large variations in deployment mechanisms,
and show that our defense is able to achieve very competitive
performance metrics for all three threats, even against strong
adaptive adversaries with full knowledge of SentiNet.
Index Terms—Neural Networks, Deep Learning, Adversarial
Gradient Perturbations, Data Poisoning, Trojaning Attacks
I. INTRODUCTION
Deep neural networks are susceptible to adversarial attacks
aimed at causing misclassifications [4], [18], [43]. As deep
learning models are also often re-used (e.g., via transfer
learning [3]), model vulnerabilities—whether inherent or pur-
posefully inserted by a malicious party [30]—can easily affect
a large number of systems. This has severe implications for
the trustability of deep learning models in security-critical
decision making. Defending these attacks is challenging due
to the wide variety of possible attack mechanisms and vectors,
especially for models operating in the visual domain. In this
work, we explore physical attacks on visual classifiers and
introduce SentiNet, a robust defense which detects adversarial
inputs without requiring any specific model re-training or prior
knowledge of the attack.
We focus on physical attacks which are localized, i.e., that
constrain the adversarial region to a small contiguous portion
of an image such as the “adversarial patch” attacks in [4],
[30]. This localization constraint has been helpful in designing
robust and physically realizable attacks, that take the form of
an adversarial object or sticker placed inside a visual scene [4],
[11], [12], [30]. In turn, these classes of attacks typically
use unbounded perturbations (i.e., without any specific `∞
or `2 constraint as in most digital attacks [18], [43]), to
Fig. 1. Physical attacks are deployed in real-world settings using physical
patterns and objects rather than modifying a digital image.
ensure that the attacks are robust to changes in viewpoint,
lighting and other physical artifacts. Several such physical
attacks aimed at causing misclassifications when applied to
arbitrary images with different class labels [4], [30] have been
demonstrated. A drawback of localized physical attacks is that
they are generally visible and detectable by the human eye,
but there are many situations where attacks can be deployed
in autonomous settings or carefully disguised [4].
A prospective defender must first consider that the model
being protected may have been compromised prior to being de-
ployed. An attack can originate from the source of the network
provider, as in the case with data poisoning attacks [20], or
can be intercepted and modified, as with trojaning attacks [30].
Even if a network is integrity protected, attackers can still
generate physical attacks that will affect the model at test time,
via adversarial examples [4]. Furthermore, there are countless
permutations positioning and behaviors these attacks could
exhibit, all which are unknown to the defense. Altogether, this
creates an extremely difficult security setting where vulnera-
bilities are easily distributed, where attackers target properties
inherent to neural network systems that cannot be removed,
and where an attacks might be too diverse in appearance for
a signature-based scheme.
Our goal is to create a defense that is attack-agnostic.
To this end, we analyze unifying necessary features of a
successful localized physical adversarial attack, and develop
SentiNet, a technique that exploits these attack behaviors to
detect them. We start from the observation that physical attacks
are designed to be robust to a variety of physical artifacts,
while generalizing to a large distribution of inputs (e.g., the
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adversarial patch of [4] is designed to work when applied to
any input image). Our first insight is that a physical attacks’
success relies on the use of “salient” features that strongly
affect the model’s classification on many different inputs.
We thus consider techniques from model interpretability and
object detection to discover highly salient contiguous regions
of an input image. As we show, these techniques uncover
adversarial image regions, as well as benign ones that strongly
affect classification. In a second step, we exploit adversarial
patches’ strong robustness and generalization properties to
distinguish them from benign patches with high saliency.
Specifically, we apply extracted image patches to a large
number of held-out benign images, and test how often a
patch results in a misclassification. Successful adversarial
patches are much more likely than benign patches to generate
misclassifications, and are thus detected by SentiNet. As we
show in our thorough evaluation of SentiNet, mounting an
attack that evades detection requires lowering an adversarial
region’s saliency to a point where the region no longer works
with high probability—even for a strong adaptive adversary
with full knowledge of the defense.
Contributions—To summarize, this paper makes the follow-
ing contributions:
• We propose SentiNet, a new architecture that protects
a neural network by using the same model to detect
physical attacks.
• To the best of our knowledge, SentiNet is the first
attack-agnostic architecture that can defend from distinct
families of physical attacks without previously seeing or
having knowledge of the attack.
• SentiNet uses a novel approach to detect a potential attack
region using techniques developed for model visualiza-
tion and object detection, and feeds the attack deployed
on multiple test images back to the network to perform
attack classification.
• We evaluate SentiNet to protect three pre-existing com-
promised and uncompromised networks against three
known attacks, i.e., adversarial examples, poisoned net-
works, and trojaned networks. We show that SentiNet can
protect neural networks successfully, with an average true
positive rate of 94.26% and an average true negative rate
of 93.96%.
• We further evaluate SentiNet against an adaptive attacker
and present six attacks against SentiNet. We show that
SentiNet is resistant even to strong adversaries by demon-
strating the robustness of each individual component.
• SentiNet requires no special training and can be instanti-
ated with off-the-shelf neural networks, while introducing
a 3x inference overhead on multi-GPU systems.
Paper Organization—Before presenting our approach and
experiments, we summarize the structure of this paper. First, in
Section II, we present the architecture of deep learning systems
and the threat model. Then, in Section III, we present SentiNet
and its architecture. In Section IV, we perform an extensive
evaluation of SentiNet covering physical attacks taken from
the literature, i.e., adversarial examples, data poisoning and
trojaned networks, and adaptive attackers trying to fool Sen-
tiNet. Next, in Section V, we discuss our results. Finally, in
Section VI, we cover related works, and in Section VII, we
provide our conclusions.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Neural Networks
Deep learning is a branch of machine learning which
focuses on multi-layered artificial neural networks [29]. A
neural network can be defined as a standard machine learning
function fm, which given an input x returns a prediction y
and prediction-confidence conf ; i.e. (y, conf) = fm(x).
Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN) [28] are a specific
architecture of neural network primarily targeted at com-
puter vision tasks. Common CNN architectures include VGG-
16 [41], ResNets [21] and Inception models [42].
B. Deep Learning Systems
Deep learning (DL) systems are computer systems that rely
on neural networks to perform specific tasks. At its essence,
a DL system takes in an input, computes an output value,
and makes a prediction based on the output. The analysis
performed by a DL system is often a classification task such as
a face-based user authentication mechanisms, voice recogni-
tion, or voice-to-text system. Recently, DL systems have been
proposed for autonomous vehicles and digital assistants [48].
In this paper, we focus on DL systems acting while pro-
cessing physical scenes, where data is acquired via sensors.
Sensors are devices that transform physical signals originating
on a scene into a stream of digital data. The output of a sensor
is then processed by a neural network to make predictions. The
prediction of the neural network will be used to determine
an appropriate action. Figure 1 shows an example of a DL
system implementing a face recognition system to unlock a
mobile device or to let a user into a building. The scene
includes the user’s face and other background objects. The
sensor can be a CCD sensor of a camera that returns a digital
image of the scene. The image is processed by a face classifier
which predicts the user identity. If the user identity is valid,
the actuator will unlock the device or open the gate.
C. Threat Model
In this work, we assume a scenario where a DL system uses
a deep CNN model to classify sensor data. The attacker’s goal
is to create a physical attack that will hijack the prediction of
the model. We allow the attacker to have white-box access to
the model, to have full control of the training process and
to modify the model in any way, and to be considered a
trusted party to the model user. The attacker intends to create
a general targeted attack that redirects a large distribution
of inputs to a specific targeted output. More specifically, we
consider three types of attack that we review below: physical
adversarial examples [2], [4], [11], [12], [27], [40], data
poisoning attacks [20], and trojaned models [25], [30].
Training a large neural network from scratch requires a
huge amount of data and computation, and developers tend to
reuse pre-trained networks [3]. Reusing a pre-trained neural
network exposes a DL system to several attacks. In particular,
we consider two attacks that originate when the origin of
the model is untrusted. One method to compromise a neural
network is via data poisoning attacks. In a data poisoning
attack, the adversary inserts malicious inputs, i.e., backdoors to
compromise the model during training [20]. Instead of training
a model with malicious data points, the adversary could also
trojan a neural network by modifying the weights of selected
neurons [25], [30] to respond to a specific trigger. For both
trojaned and poisoned networks, the adversary can modify a
network to respond to specific objects.
Another threat to DL systems are adversarial examples [18],
[43]. Adversarial examples are maliciously-crafted inputs
causing a neural network to make an incorrect prediction.
Most of the existing literature on adversarial examples requires
the attacker to control the neural network input at the byte
level. In a physical DL system, this means that the attacker
controls either the sensor to generate the desired stream of
bytes or the communication channel between the sensor and
the model to modify the data. However, the sensor and the
communication channel of a DL system may not be accessible
by an attacker. As a result, the attacker can only influence the
stream of data values to the model by showing the sensor
physical objects. Recent works have shown that adversaries
can create malicious physical objects, e.g., printed patches [4],
[11], [12], [40] or 3D objects [2], that can fool a model
under real-world conditions such as lighting, sensor noise,
and rotation. As opposed to the more traditional perturbations,
physical perturbations are localized in a region of the input.
III. SENTINET
In this section, we present SentiNet. The goal of SentiNet is
to identify adversarial inputs that will hijack the prediction of
the model. Specifically, SentiNet intends to protect networks
against adversarial examples, trigger trojans, and backdoors
without assuming knowledge of what the attack will be
beforehand. The core insight of SentiNet is to use this very
behavior of adversarial misclassification to detect an attack.
First, SentiNet uses techniques from model interpretability
and object detection to extract from an input scene x those
regions that most highly influence the model prediction y
(Section III-A). These regions likely contain the malicious
object (if present) as well as benign salient regions. Then,
SentiNet applies these extracted regions on a set of benign
test inputs and observes the behavior of the model. Finally,
SentiNet uses fuzzing techniques to compare these synthetic
behaviors with the known behavior of the model on benign
inputs, to detect prediction hijacking (Section III-B).
A. Adversarial Object Localization
The first step of our approach intends to localize on the
given input the regions that might contain malicious objects.
The idea is to identify the parts of the input x that contribute
to the model prediction y. Because the physical attack is small
and localized, we can hope to recover the true class of input
x if we evaluate the model on a segmented input that contains
no part of the attack. In the following, we look into the details
of each step. First, we present a segmentation-based approach
to propose classes. Then, starting from proposed classes and
the given input, we generate a mask for x that may contain
the malicious object.
Class Proposal via Segmentation—The detection of the
attack begins with the identification of a set of possible classes
that may be predicted by the model fm. The first of such
classes is the actual prediction, i.e., y = fm(x). The other
classes are identified by segmenting the input x and then eval-
uating the network on each segment. Algorithm 1 shows the
algorithm to propose classes via input segmentation. Different
approaches can be used to segment a given input x including
sliding windows and network-based region proposals [37]. In
our approach, we use the selective search image segmentation
algorithm [45]. Selective search generates an exhaustive list
of region proposals based on the patterns and edges found in
natural scenes [45]. Then, we evaluate each proposed segment,
i.e., f(xp), and return the k most confident predictions, where
k is a configuration parameter of SentiNet.
Algorithm 1: ClassProposal
in : fm – model;
x – input of fm;
k – propositions
out: C - set of proposed classes and confidence (|C| = k)
1 P = SelectiveSearch (x);
2 C = {fm(xp) : xp ∈ P )};
3 C = TopConf(C, k);
4 return C
Mask Generation—Over the past few years, several tech-
niques have been proposed to explain and interpret the pre-
diction of a model. One strategy attempts to “quantify” the
relevance of individual pixels of the input, e.g., using saliency
maps [46]. While effective in practice, focusing on individual
pixels may result in a mask of non-contiguous pixels. Sparse
masks may miss elements of the malicious object and are
not suitable for the model testing phase (see Section III-B).
Alternative approaches do not operate on individual pixels but
attempt to recover discriminative image regions used by the
model to identify the inputs of the same class. Unfortunately,
many of these approaches require modifying and fine-tuning a
base model, e.g., Class Activation Mapping (CAM) [49] . Such
modifications may alter the behavior of the model, including
the malicious behavior that SentiNet intends to detect and
prevent from being exploited.1
1We verified that CAM cannot be used with trojaned network as it removes
the last layer (i.e., Layer FC6-8 of face recognition model of [30]) rendering
the trigger trojan not detectable.
Fig. 2. Overview of the SentiNet architecture. The output and class proposals of an input are used to generate masks, which are then fed back into the model
to generate values for boundary analysis and attack classification.
Fig. 3. Top Row: Mask Generation using Grad-CAM. The left figure shows
the Grad-CAM heatmap with respect to the targeted ’0’ class, and the right
figure shows the extracted mask that covers areas outside the physical attack.
Bottom Row: The left-most figure is the Grad-CAM heatmap with respect to
the targeted ’0’ class, and the center figure is Grad-CAM with respect to a
proposed class. Combining masks of class proposals increases the precision
of the mask with respect to the physical attack.
A particularly suitable approach for our goal is Grad-
CAM [8], a model-interpretation technique identifies con-
tiguous spatial regions of an input without requiring modi-
fications to the original model. At a high level, Grad-CAM
uses gradients computed in the final layers of a network to
calculate the saliency of input regions. For class c, Grad-
CAM calculates the gradients of the model’s output yc (the
model’s logit score for class c) with respect to each of the
k feature maps Ak of the model’s final pooling layer to
obtain δy
c
δAk
. The mean gradient value of each filter map, or
“neuron importance weight”, is denoted αkc :=
1
ZΣiΣj
δyc
δAk
.
Finally, the feature maps Ak are weighted by their neuron
importance and aggregated to obtain the final Grad-CAM
output: LcGrad−CAM := ReLU(Σkα
k
cA
k). Here, ReLU(x) =
max(x, 0) is the ReLU activation function [15] which retains
only the positive gradient signals for class c. The output of
Grad-CAM is a coarse heatmap of the positive importance of
the image, usually at a lower resolution that the input image
due to downsampling in the model’s convolutional and pooling
layers. Finally, masks are produced by binarizing the heatmap
with a threshold of 15% of max intensity. We use this mask
to segment salient regions for the next steps.
Precise Mask Generation—Although Grad-CAM can suc-
cessfully identify discriminative input regions corresponding
to adversarial objects, it may also identify benign salient areas.
An illustrative example is in Figure 3, where the Grad-CAM
generated heatmap for a facial recognition network covers both
a trojan trigger patch but also the original face. To improve
the accuracy of the mask, we query the model for additional
predictions on selected regions of the input image. Then, for
each prediction, we use Grad-CAM to extract a mask for
the input area most relevant for the prediction. Finally, we
combine these additional masks to refine the mask of the initial
prediction y.
Once we derive a list of possible classes present in the
picture, we carve out the regions of x more relevant for each
predicted class. For simplicity, in this section, we assume that
each input can contain only one malicious object. We show
how to generalize this approach to multiple malicious inputs
in Section IV-C. Algorithm 2 shows the procedure to extract
input regions from x.
We start by extracting the mask using Grad-CAM for the
input x and prediction y. We also extract a mask for each
proposed class yp. Performing Grad-CAM on the other pro-
posed classes allows us to locate the important regions of the
image besides the adversarial attack. Additionally, because the
adversarial region is often negatively correlated with the non-
targeted classes, the heatmap actively avoids highlighting the
adversarial regions of the image. We can use these heatmaps
to generate secondary masks to improve our original mask
by subtracting regions where the masks overlap. This results
in masks that highlight only the localized attack and not the
other salient regions in the image. In Figure 3, we can see this
approach applied to generate a more precise mask containing
mostly the adversarial region only.
Algorithm 2: MaskGeneration
in : fm – model;
x – input for fm;
y, conf – model prediction on x;
C – proposed classes
out: M - masks for candidate regions with the malicious
object
1 masky = MaskGradCAM(fm, x, y);
2 M = {(masky−MaskGradCAM(fm, x, yp), confp)
: (yp, confp) ∈ C};
3 return M
B. Attack Detection
The detection of an attack requires two steps. First, as
described above, SentiNet extracts input regions that are likely
to contain adversarial patches. Then, SentiNet tests each of
these regions on a set of benign images, as detailed below, to
discriminate adversarial regions from benign ones.
Testing—Once an input region is localized, SentiNet observes
the effects the region has on the model to determine whether
the region is adversarial or benign. To do so, SentiNet overlays
the suspected region on a set of benign test images X , which
are often shipped together with deployed models. These test
images are fed back into the network, where the number of
fooled examples are counted and used for adversarial images.
Intuitively, the higher the number of mutated images can
fool the model, the more likely the suspected region is an
adversarial attack.
When the recovered mask is small, this feedback technique
is effective at distinguishing adversarial and benign inputs, as
small benign objects cannot typically overwhelm a network’s
prediction. However, one problem of such an approach is that a
mask that covers a large fraction of the input image will likely
cause misclassifications when overlaid onto other images, even
for benign inputs. Consider, for example, a large mask of an
input image x. When overlaid, the features inside the mask are
likely to be more relevant than the features outside, increasing
the chance to classify the mutated test inputs as y. A way to
address this issue is suppressing the features inside a mask
with inert patterns, i.e., a pattern with low confidence, so to
increase the response of the network to the features outside the
mask. Masks too large will tend to block out too much of the
test images resulting in low confidences, giving us another data
point to use for classifying attacks. An actual adversarial input
should have both high avgConf and Fooled values, while a
benign input will have tradeoffs between the two values.
Decision Boundary for Detection—Now, with these two
metrics (number of images fooled and average inert pattern
confidence values) we can determine under which conditions
an input x is adversarial. A naive approach is to use thresh-
olding based rules, but it is hard to determine how to set
the thresholds and which metric holds more importance. We
examine this problem by plotting metrics from an example
task in a 2D plot in Figure 4, where the red triangular dots
represent metrics found with adversarial examples containing
physical and the blue circular dots are calculated from clean
examples. We observe that the adversarial and clean points
can be easily separated using a parabolic function, suggesting
that a classifier approach such as linear regression or support
vector machine could be used. However, this would operate
under the false assumption that we have prior examples of
adversarial inputs. Ideally, we want to create a technique that
would allow us to identify an unseen adversarial input as an
attack based on the attack-agnostic metrics.
We notice a general pattern where adversarial examples
are usually clustered near the top-right of the plot. Because
Algorithm 3: Testing
in : fm – model;
x – input for fm;
y – class of x;
M – proposed masks;
X – bening test images;
out: attack - true/false
1 R = {x ∗mask : mask ∈M};
2 IP = InertPattern (M );
3 XR = Overlay (X , R);
4 XIP = Overlay (X , IP );
5 fooledyR = 0, avgconfIP = 0;
6 for xR,xIP ∈ XR, XIP do
7 (yR, confR), (yIP, confIP ) = f(xR), f(xIP );
8 if yR == y then
9 fooledyR += 1
10 avgconfIP += confIP
11 avgconfIP = avgconfIP /|X|;
12 return fooledyRR, avgconfIP ;
adversarial examples are designed to cause misclassifications
when applied to other images and not overly obstruct the other
important regions of an image, it makes sense that both the
number of images fooled and the average noisy confidence
metrics of an adversarial example would be high. We can
use our set of benign test images to generate statistics of
the metrics of normal examples, which will then allow us to
formulate when an input is abnormally adversarial.
We can use our collected metrics on clean examples to
approximate a curve. By taking the points most likely to
be the bounds of the statistics of our examples, we can
approximate a curve where points lying outside our curve
function can be classified as adversarial attacks. We collect
our points by taking the points with the highest y-values for x-
intervals, and then using a non-linear least squares function to
approximate our curve. We then use our approximated curve to
set classify attacks by calculating the distance between a curve
and a point —using the Constrained Optimization by Linear
Approximation (COBYLA) method [44]—and determining
whether that distance is within a threshold estimated by the
distances of clean examples lying outside the curve.
IV. EVALUATION
SentiNet does not modify the original network through
retraining or layer modification, and thus will not impact the
performance of the network. Instead, it acts as a protection
layer that determines whether the resulting output of the
original network can be trusted. SentiNet needs to protect a
network from adversarial inputs exploiting both inherent vul-
nerabilities of neural networks and implanted ones. In addition,
SentiNet needs to be robust against an adaptive adversary
that may attempt to bypass SentiNet. SentiNet is executed
after the model prediction and requires several computationally
intensive operations including the Grad-CAM visualizations,
Algorithm 4: DecisionBoundary
in : B – sampled behavior of fm
out: fcurve – approximated curve function;
t – acceptable distance from fcurve
1 fcurve = ApproximateCurve(OutPts(B));
2 avgd = 0;
3 for (x, y) ∈ B do
4 if fcurve(x) > y then
5 avgd += COBYLA((y, x), fcurve);
6 t = avgd/|B|;
7 return fcurve, t;
Fig. 4. Example of boundary detection for the a trojaned using 400 data
points and random noise as inert pattern. On the left, the adversarial and
benign metrics are plotted as red triangles and blue circles respectively; on
the right, we plot the curve proposal from the sampled points, i.e., the benign
test images X .
the selective search algorithm, and multiple evaluations of
the network under protection. As a result, as SentiNet adds
overhead between the classification and the actuator, SentiNet
needs to be efficient.
In this section, we evaluate SentiNet covering these three
dimensions. After presenting the experiment setup in Sec-
tion IV-A, in Section IV-B, we evaluate the effectiveness of
SentiNet in detecting three known attacks, i.e., adversarial
patches, trojan triggers, and backdoors. Then, in Section IV-C,
we evaluate the robustness of SentiNet against an adaptive
attacker that attempts to bypass SentiNet. Finally, in Sec-
tion IV-D, we look into the performance overhead of SentiNet
in terms of wallclock and runtime analysis.
A. Experiment Settings
We evaluated SentiNet when protecting three publicly avail-
able networks shared by other researchers. Two of the selected
networks are compromised and one is uncompromised. The
compromised networks are a backdoored Faster-RCNN net-
work for reading signs detection by Gu et al. [20] and a VGG-
16 trojaned network for facial recognition by Liu et al. [30].
The uncompromised network is a VGG-16 network trained on
the Imagenet dataset by Simonyan et al. [41]. Additionally, to
operate, SentiNet requires a benign test image set X and an
inert pattern s to generate the decision boundary as shown in
Fig. 5. The top row shows the backdoor, i.e,. a flower, and the Grad-CAM
output for the class “warning-sign” on an adversarial stop sign. The bottom
row shows the decision boundary generated of the poisoned network. The blue
circles denote benign inputs and the red triangles denote adversarial inputs.
Section III-B. We present the generation of each test set X
for the selected networks in Section IV-B. Unless specified,
we use random noise for our inert pattern s.
We evaluated SentiNet using a Tesla K-80 GPU on an
Ubuntu 18.04 machine with Intel Xeon CPU E5-2697 and 72
cores. SentiNet uses Tensorflow 1.5 to generate the adversarial
patches for the uncompromised network, BLVC-Caffe for
the trojaned network, and Faster-RCNN Caffe [14] for the
poisoned network. To parallelize the class proposal, SentiNet
relies on the ROI pooling layer as implemented by the Fast-
RCNN Caffe version. Finally, SentiNet uses the off-the-shelf
implementations of Grad-CAM [38] and selective search [45].2
Finally, we measure effectiveness and robustness in terms of
accuracy and performance, collecting the TP/TN and FP/FN
rates of each attack. We measure efficiency by profiling the
execution of each step of SentiNet.
B. Known Attacks
The first part of our evaluation assesses the effective-
ness of SentiNet in protecting our selected networks against
three attacks, i.e., backdoors [20], trojan triggers [30], and
adversarial patches [4]. For each attack, we measured the
effectiveness of SentiNet with and without mask refinement.
For the adversarial patches attack, we considered an additional
variant where the attacker uses multiple patches at the same
time. The summary of this evaluation is in Table I.
2We will publish scripts, models, and datasets on GitHub after publication.
TABLE I
EFFECTIVENESS OF SENTINET AGAINST KNOWN ATTACKS #1-4.
Network Vuln. Attack Inert Noise TP TN FP FN
Faster-RCNN [20] Poisoned Attack #1 Random 85.07% 86.90% 13.10% 14.83%
Faster-RCNN [20] Poisoned Attack #1, w/o mask reduction Random 85.61% 76.55% 23.45% 14.39%
VGG-16 [30] Trojaned Attack #2 Random 99.18% 99.75% 0.25% 0.82%
VGG-16 [30] Trojaned Attack #2, w/o mask reduction Random 87.77% 99.25% 0.75% 12.23%
VGG-16 [30] Trojaned Attack #2 Checker 99.18% 99.50% 0.50% 0.82%
VGG-16 [41] - Attack #3 Random 98.52% 95.25% 4.75% 1.48%
VGG-16 [41] - Attack #3, w/o mask reduction Random 98.52% 95.00% 5.00% 1.48%
VGG-16 [41] - Attack #4 Random 99.19% 95.25% 4.75% 0.81%
Attack #1: Poisoned Networks—The first attack that we
evaluate is a backdoor attack against a poisoned network.
While this attack has been studied in the past, the availability
of poisoned networks for classification tasks is quite limited.
Accordingly, we resort to the poisoned Faster-RCNN object
detection network shared by Gu et al. [20], a network that is
trained to detect the position of stop signs on the input image.
The authors poisoned the training set so that the network
will incorrectly classify stop signs with a yellow flower—the
backdoor—as a warning sign (see Figure 5).
As Faster-RCNN is an object detection network, we paid
particular attention when connecting it to SentiNet. First, the
prediction of Faster-RCNN consists of bounding boxes, classes
and confidence of the detected objects. Instead of processing
these outputs, we bypass the bounding box prediction layer
and connect SentiNet directly to the class likelihood output. In
doing so, SentiNet will have access to classes and confidence
values only. Second, the Faster-RCNN network detects objects
that are often a small part of the background scene, in contrast
to cropped images often used for classification tasks. To
modify our input to be compatible with the detection network
as a classification task, we take the image we intend to classify
and place it onto a larger image. As an example, with an image
of dimension h ×W , we can create a larger blank image of
H ×W where H = h× n and W = w × n, with a carefully
chosen n value. We then place our image at the coordinates
h,w, and input as our ROI proposal bbox = (h,w, 2h, 2w) as
our starting x, starting y, ending x, and ending y coordinates.
This larger image is projected into a feature map using spatial
pyramid techniques before we feed it through the network with
our ground-truth bounding box (bbox) as the ROI input. This
technique allows us to leave unchanged the performance of
the Faster-RCNN.
Once prepared the classifier fm, we create the boundary
decision as described in Section III-B. To prepare the data for
this task, we collected 145 images of stop signs from the LISA
dataset [33] by cropping out the images with their labelled
bounding boxes, and place the backdoor at approximately
below the “stop” text of each sign to create an “attack”
dataset. The dataset in this technique contains 130 images
which successfully fool our Faster-RCNN. We also prepare our
test set X by cropping out 100 images from each class with
equal probability. With our prepared dataset, we run SentiNet
on all 130 adversarial examples and on all 145 clean examples,
Fig. 6. The top row shows the trigger used by Liu et al. [30] and the Grad-
CAM output of “A.J. Buckley” on an a face of the actress Mary Astor with
the trigger. The bottom row shows the decision boundary. We use blue circles
for benign inputs and red triangles denoting adversarial inputs.
collecting the final classifications for each example.
As shown in Figure 5, the clean data points trend towards
lower avgConf values in comparison to the backdoored
inputs. By plotting out enough data points from our clean
dataset, we can construct the decision boundary to set the
attack threshold. Our TP and TN rates are both ∼85%, as
shown in Table I. As we will see later on in the section,
these numbers are not as competitive as other experiments,
which is likely due to both the coarser heatmaps generated by
the smaller ROI pooling layer and the lower resolution of the
images in the LISA dataset—stop signs are often cropped to
sizes as small as 30×30. Nevertheless, SentiNet still produces
detection accuracies comparable to other adversarial detection
works (see, e.g., [5]).
Attack #2: Trojaned Networks—A trojaning attack generates
a trigger from specified neurons in the network, and then
fine-tunes the model on the trigger to respond to a specific
output. The generated trigger can be created with any shape
or size using both convolutional and fully-connected neurons.
The trojaned model we for our target network fm is the facial
recognition model shared by Liu et al. [30] with a VGG-16
architecture [41] trained on the VGG-Face dataset [36]. In the
evaluation, we used the square trigger that can be generated
with neurons from the FC6 layer of the VGG-16 network. This
trigger hijack the prediction of the VGG-16 network to class
0, i.e., “A.J. Buckley”. We use a separate facial recognition
dataset to generate our clean and adversarial datasets. We use
400 examples of the LFW dataset [24], placing the trigger
of each of these images. Of the 400 adversarial images, 368
of them successfully direct the output of the model to class
0. Our test set X consists of 100 images from the original
VGG-16 dataset [41].
The plot in Figure 6 shows clear separation between normal
samples (in blue) and the adversarial samples (in red). We can
see that most of the blue examples fail to fool the model with
the exception of several masks which produce low avgConf
scores, while the adversarial examples fool a high number of
images while preserving very high avgConf scores with the
overlaid inert pattern. Thus, after plotting out enough points
from our clean dataset, we can subsample the points with
the highest confidence scores to create our boundary. This
classification rule produces TP and TN rates above 99%, as
shown in Table I.
In this task, we can also see the greater importance of our
mask reduction technique. The trojan mechanism in particular
seems work with the combination of both trigger and the
original facial regions. This often results in the Grad-Cam
highlighting regions outside the trigger. Table I, we can see
the clear improvement Mask Reduction has on improving the
True Positive and True Negative rates of SentiNet.
Attack #3: Adversarial Patches—Adversarial patches are
white-box attacks that use gradient perturbations to generate
a highly salient patch. We use the patch provided by Brown
et al. [4] as our physical attack, which fools Imagenet trained
models to classify adversarial images as a “toaster”. In our
case, we use a VGG-16 [41] Imagenet-pretrained [10] network
as our target network fm. We choose the size of the patch to
occupy around 25% of the input images. We randomly sample
400 images from the Imagenet test set [10] to implement
our attack. We place the patch at random positions on the
400 images to generate our adversarial dataset, retrieving 338
images which successfully direct the output of our model to
“toaster”. Our test set X consists of 100 randomly selected
images from the Imagenet training set.
In Figure 7, we observe that the adversarial (red triangle)
points are skewed towards producing both higher numFooled
and avgConf numbers. The classification rule generated by
this curve produces TP rates of ∼98% and TN rates of ∼95%
as seen in Table I. These results compare favorably to other
literature focused on adversarial attack detection.
Fig. 7. The top row shows the adversarial patch by Brown et al. [4] and
the Grad-CAM output of “toaster” on a randomly chosen adversarial image.
The bottom row shows the decision boundary. The blue circles denote benign
inputs and the red triangles denote adversarial inputs.
Fig. 8. The top row shows the Grad-CAM output of “toaster” with disjoint
adversarial patches and the generated mask. The bottom row shows the
decision boundary. The blue circles denote benign inputs and the red triangles
denote adversarial inputs.
Attack #4: Multiple Adversarial Patches—As an extension
of Attack #3, we perform experiments on images containing
multiple adversarial patches, using the same target network
fm and patch from Attack #3. The setup is largely the
same as the previous setting, except that two slightly smaller
patches are randomly placed on opposing sides of an image.
This experiment is mainly performed to highlight SentiNet’s
generalizability to detect attacks that are unpredictable in
deployment and appearance. Being able to detect disjoint
attacks is a great demonstration of the ability of our model to
identify attacks without any prior knowledge of the adversary.
Grad-CAM can be used to visualize disjoint regions of an
image that contribute towards the same class. As we can see
in Figure 8, this applies to adversarial patches, with both
patches successfully highlighted in the attack example. We
do not have to modify our technique to make SentiNet work
in this scenario. We use a random sample of 400 images
from Imagenet test set to create our dataset (we also use
100 images from Imagenet train set as test set X). With two
patches inserted, we are able to produce a higher attack success
rate, with 369 detected examples. After running SentiNet on
both our adversarial and clean datasets, we find our TP rate
to be 99.19% and our TN rate to be 95.25% (see Table
I). Additionally, we perform an experiment to measure how
often SentiNet is able to successfully detect both patches by
checking whether the generated masks are disjoint and cover
substantial portions of both patches. We find that SentiNet
discovers both patches 97.4% of the time, which we consider
to be sufficiently accurate relative to the TP and TN values.
C. Adaptive Attacks
Our previous analysis demonstrates how SentiNet detects
multiple categories of attacks without having prior knowledge
of the adversary or having to modify the defense. A threat is
still posed by “adaptive attacks”, which are targeted and by-
pass specific defenses. The next section considers an attacker
aware of the presence of SentiNet and its mechanisms, where-
upon the attack is adapted to avoid detection by SentiNet. We
probe our defense from the perspective of an actual attacker
to measure the robustness of our technique. We attempt to
compromise the three distinct component of our defense;
the heatmap proposal (Section IV-C1), the class proposals
(Section IV-C2), and the attack classification (Section IV-C3).
We will analyze the robustness of each component from the
perspective of a potential attacker.
1) Attacking Region Proposals: Our defense is reliant on
successfully localizing the adversarial region in an image. In
our current framework, this is done using the Grad-CAM
algorithm, which generates heatmap of the salient regions
leading to a classification. If an attack can disrupt the Grad-
CAM mechanism and avoid successful detection and local-
ization, the subsequent components of the pipeline will fail.
The Grad-CAM mechanism uses network back-propagation
to measure region importance. This means our mechanism
is differentiable, which theoretically means we can modify
our heatmap outputs using targeted gradient perturbations.
However, our experiments show that Grad-CAM is robust
against adversarial attacks in our defense context, and strongly
suggests that Grad-CAM is capturing the inherent saliency of
a region and cannot be easily manipulated.
Attack #5: Perturbing Grad-CAM—We first show that
perturbational noise can target specific Grad-CAM outputs.
The Grad-CAM function LcGradCAM = ReLU(Σkα
k
cA
k) is
differentiable, and we can optimize an input on this function
given a target class. We can use a standard Stochastic Gradient
Descent Optimizer (SGD) on a VGG-16 network [41] to
minimize a loss function calculated as the total difference
between the current Grad-CAM output and the target Grad-
CAM output, and iteratively add noise until our loss converges.
Figure 9 is a image of a dog overlaid by an adversarial
patch, and the subsequent Grad-CAM heatmap on target class
“toaster”. We start from random noise, which does not have
any salient regions for the “toaster” class, and optimize the
input on our loss function. We demonstrate in Figure 9 that
the heatmap output of the generated noise at convergence is
visually identical to the original heatmap. This conclusively
shows that Grad-CAM outputs can be precisely manipulated
through gradient optimization. However, to mount such an
attack, the attacker is required to add noise to the entire image,
which may not be feasible.
Attack #6: Heatmap Misdirection—A potential behavior an
attacker might attempt to generate is heatmap region misdirec-
tion, where the heatmap proposes a region that does not cover
the adversarial region to either increase the region captured or
avoid detection altogether. We demonstrate earlier that this is
trivially possible if the attacker is allowed to add perturbational
noise to an entire image. However, in our setting, the attacker
cannot add noise beyond the region of the localized attack, and
therefore Grad-CAM perturbations must also be constrained
to the adversarial region. Therefore, the threat we want to
consider is that an attacker can add noise in one region of an
image that increases the Grad-CAM output value in a disjoint
region. We again consider the target heatmap of our adversarial
patch in Figure 9. We first show in Figure 9 that if noise
region overlaps the Grad-CAM location we want to modify,
we will able to modify the heatmap successfully. We also
show in Figure 9 that if the noise region is disjoint from the
target Grad-CAM region, our Grad-CAM optimization fails to
achieve either visual similarity or equivalent final convergence
loss. These experiments show that localized noise can only
affect the corresponding Grad-CAM region, which strongly
suggests that a misdirection attack is not possible.
Attack #7: Heatmap Minimization—If heatmap misdirection
is not possible with localized noise, another option the attacker
can consider is to minimize the corresponding Grad-CAM
region to the greatest extent possible to avoid detection. We
can modify our loss function as the value of the Grad-CAM
region to optimize for minimal Grad-CAM output. We start
from the adversarial patch image in Figure 10 and iteratively
add perturbational noise to the region. In Figure 10, we
Fig. 9. We calculate Grad-CAM for label “toaster” on each of the inputs.
The first row shows the Grad-CAM output for adversarial patch overlaid on
an image of a dog. The second row demonstrates that we can reproduce the
Grad-CAM output using gradient perturbations (Attack #5). The third row
shows that producing a similar heatmap is still possible if the patch is located
near the targeted heatmap (Attack #6). However, the fourth row shows that
we are unable to affect the Grad-CAM output directly if we are not allowed
perturb noise on the targeted Grad-CAM location (Attack #6).
show that as our loss converges, the Grad-CAM output is
successfully minimized, avoiding detection. We can also see
in Figure 10 that as more noise is added, the success rate of
our attack is reduced. This pattern suggests that Grad-CAM is
capturing some inherent saliency of the region and cannot be
minimized without reducing the attack effectiveness.
However, we would also expect the effectiveness of the
attack to drop with the addition of any arbitrary noise, and
does not rule out the possibility of perturbational noise that can
optimize both targeted misclassification and Grad-CAM min-
imization. Our next experiments demonstrate how an attacker
might attempt to jointly generate a patch for both criteria by
Fig. 10. The top row shows a new adversarial patch that can minimize the
Grad-CAM output of label “toaster” on the location of the patch. However,
the bottom plot shows that as the Grad-CAM output sum decreases, the attack
success drops correspondingly.
performing both optimization functions during every iteration.
We use a range of α from 4.0 to 1.0 with intervals of 0.025
and set the learning rates of the Grad-CAM minimization and
the misclassification as (α) and (1− α) respectively, as seen
in Figure 11. This adjusts the level or prioritization we set
for each optimization task. After we generate 40 patches for
each α value, we plot the average of both the percentage
of successful misclassifications on Imagenet [10] test set X
from Attack #3 and the percentage of patches with < 0.5
overlap with the adversarial pixels and the Grad-CAM region
in Figure 11. Our plot shows that there is an inverse relation
between how well the patch fools test images and how well
the patch is hidden, corroborating our previous findings. We
further plot the patches that successfully fulfill both criteria in
Figure 11, and find that the optimum value is where the ratios
of successful misclassifications and hidden patches overlaps,
giving us patches that fulfill both criteria at most a 10%
success rate. This strongly suggests that minimizing the Grad-
CAM output directly weakens the attack effectiveness, and that
it is difficult to jointly optimize for both objectives.
We can conclude that the redirection task for Grad-CAM is
infeasible for localized patches, and that minimizing Grad-
CAM is incompatible with the misclassification objective.
Therefore, Grad-CAM is reasonably resistant to adaptive at-
tacks and is a robust choice for the region proposal task.
2) Class Proposal: Our class proposal module uses selec-
tive search [45] and a proposal network modified from the
original network with a ROI pooling layer [14]. Selective
search is a traditional image processing algorithm that uses
Fig. 11. In the top row, the left and right patches are generated to maximize
Grad-CAM minimization and Attack success respectively. We can see in
the bottom row plot that it is difficult to optimize for both objectives, and
that patches that successfully fulfill both objectives can achieve at most 10%
effectiveness in both bypassing Grad-CAM and attacking successfully.
a graph-based approach to segment an image based on color,
shapes, textures, and size. There is no gradient component for
an attacker to perturb, or a training procedure to poison, which
severely limits an attacker’s mechanisms of attack compared
to a network-generated proposal mechanism as seen in Faster-
RCNN [37]. Our selective search algorithm is also designed
to capture class proposals other than adversarial class, and the
attacker will be unable to affect the selective search results
outside of the adversarial region. Furthermore, because our
proposal network uses the original network weights, there
is no way to cause different behaviors between the original
and proposal networks. Finally, the attacker will have limited
motivation to attack the class proposal process of our network,
as a successful attack will damage the accuracy of the attack
detection rather than break the entire process. We can con-
clude that our class proposal mechanism is robust due to the
properties of the individual components that are collectively
resistant to perturbational or poisoning attacks.
3) Attack Classification: We consider the decision proce-
dure of our method by analyzing our attack classification
robustness. Our classification procedure is not trained with
gradient descent techniques, which removes the possibility
of using gradient perturbations to fool the classification. Our
thresholding is based on data points with two dimensions col-
lected from a confidential X dataset, the X fooled-percentage
and the X average confidence. The X average-confidence is
calculated with a pattern s.
Attack #8: Classification—If an adversary is able to manip-
Fig. 12. Inert Patterns: The default pattern we use for s is random noise
shown on the left. Another pattern we can potentially use is the checkered
pattern on the right which the VGG-Face network also responds weakly to.
ulate the model to respond to an inert pattern s with strong
confidence they can produce similar outputs between benign
and adversarial inputs, bypassing our defense. We show we
can keep the pattern s secret by demonstrating how arbitrary
patterns still produce similar levels of accuracies, by using the
standard random noise pattern and a new checker pattern as
shown in Figure 12. In Table I, we can see that for Attack #2,
the TP and TN rates of the random noise pattern and checker
pattern are within ≤ 0.25%. Also, the defense will always
be able to find an inert pattern by using gradient descent to
minimize response confidence for all classes. This component
of SentiNet secure as long as the pattern is kept secret.
Attack #9: Patterns Targeting Different Classes—An at-
tacker can place multiple patches into the image targeting
different classes. Our defense will capture one of the patches,
leaving the other patch to pass through undetected. We can
modify our defense to run iterations of our defense until the
image is no longer classified as an adversarial by adding a
linear increase in runtime for each additional patch.
Attack #10: Size Attack—If the attacker uses a large enough
patch, the average confidence on X will be lowered, which
reduces the effectiveness of our defense. We can see in
Figure 13 that for adversarial patches, the attack’s avgConf
drops as the size of the patch increases. By increasing the
transparency of the patch, we can drop the attack below the
threshold while retaining very high attack success. However,
we argue that this is an unavoidable aspect of localized attacks.
Brown et al. [4] notes that overlaying a image of an actual
toaster will create the same behavior of an adversarial patch
at a large enough size. This raises interested questions about
what actually constitutes an “attack”, although for now we can
conclude our defense captures small patches that abnormally
affects the classification results at an extent greater than
expected for natural images.
D. Performance
We evaluate the overhead of our defense in terms of rounded
wallclock time in Table II, using a VGG-16 [41] architecture
as a case study. In general, a forward pass through the network
takes 2.5 seconds, regardless of batch size, while the selective
search and Grad-CAM each take 2.25 and 0.35 seconds
respectively. If we use a sequential approach to implement
Fig. 13. Size analysis of Adversarial Patches. The legend denotes the ratio
of the image to the input, and we can see that the AvgConf drops as the
size increases. On the right, we plot the attack success rate after increasing
the transparency values, and we can see that with large (> 0.35) patches the
input drops below the decision boundary while still retaining a 90% attack
success rate.
TABLE II
RUNTIME OF ANALYSIS OF SENTINET. WALLCLOCK TIMES OF EACH
INDIVIDUAL COMPONENT AND OF THE TOTAL SEQUENTIAL AND
PARALLELIZED TIME ARE SHOWN.
Operation Runtime (s)
Selective Search 2.25
Forward Pass 2.5
Class Proposal 2.5
Grad-CAM 0.35
Sequential Total 23.3
Parallelized Total 7.6
SentiNet, we will perform a forward pass to get the initial
prediction on input x, a selective search on x, class proposal
on x, three Grad-CAMs on the highest class proposals, and
three iterations of two batched computations to get AvgConf
and Fooled to get a total runtime of 23.3 seconds. However,
many steps can be computed in parallel given enough compute.
In general, the original prediction and class proposals can
be computed in parallel, as well as the three Grad-CAM
computations and the final 6 batched computations. This cuts
the total time down to 7.6 seconds, which is 3x as large as
the original prediction time of 2.5 seconds.
V. DISCUSSION
Our results show that our defense is able to record high
accuracy metrics for detecting adversarial images in all three
cases and is robust to strong adaptive adversaries. We now
cover in more depth the strengths and limitations of our
approach, highlighting some unusual aspects of our design.
A. Strengths of our Defense
Proportional Defense—The fundamental strength of SentiNet
is that it relies on the fact our model is compromised by
an attack. Therefore, our detection framework is unaffected
by the mechanism or deployment the attack uses, detecting
attacks successfully as long as they fool the model. In fact,
our framework is better at detecting attacks when the adversary
is stronger. Very powerful physical attacks are able to consis-
tently fool the model while minimizing the size needed or
the obfuscation important parts of the image to order to avoid
detection. The properties that characterize a strong physical
attack make it easier for SentiNet detection as such an attack
would easily result in outlier behavior outside the threshold
of an approximated curve. In real-world conditions, attacks
have to be even more robust as they need to tolerate different
lighting and viewpoint variations. Real-world deployments of
neural networks could potentially represent the most potent
deployment scenario for SentiNet.
Detection of Unsuccessful Attacks—SentiNet can also fur-
ther extended for additional functionality. With the adversarial
input detection and class proposal, SentiNet can analyze also
the second or subsequent proposed classes, raising the possibil-
ity of using SentiNet to detect unsuccessful attempted attacks.
This is a useful attribute which could help deter attackers from
probing and testing our defense with experimental attacks.
Run-time Adversarial Object Suppression—Furthermore,
the masking functionality can be used to still preserve func-
tionality by reporting the output label with the inert pattern.
Unlike other detection frameworks which simply identify
when an attack has taken place, the calculated mask of
SentiNet can easily be used to remove the physical attack and
salvage as much of the rest of the data as possible.
B. Limitations of our Defense
Large Adversarial Objects—In general, adversaries can
override an image prediction if they are allowed to modify the
majority of pixels in an image. SentiNet makes the assumption
that adversarial objects are small. We show in Section IV that
large enough patches can easily bypass the decision boundary
of our model. However, we note once more that Brown et
al. [4] demonstrates how large images of toasters will hijack
the prediction of classification models, which is expected
behavior even for a human classifier. In general, if an attacker
can modify a majority of an image, it is trivial to influence the
output by obfuscating the input with the targeted class. Our
focus with SentiNet is to capture adversarial attacks that are
unreasonably salient, designed to be small and unnoticeable
and that would not fool humans. With this measure, SentiNet
largely succeeds at detecting abnormal regions of images that
deviate from patches of natural images.
Overhead—The runtime of our approach is not insignificant
at ∼3x the original computation time. Each inference requires
a constant overhead, raising the inference time from millisec-
onds to several seconds. This lag for real-time detection sce-
narios is perhaps acceptable for tasks like facial recognition,
but could prove impractical in scenarios including autonomous
driving. However, the computational cost is even more signif-
icant, as instead of performing one forward pass through our
network, SentiNet performs hundreds of batched inferences.
In non real-time situations, it is common for inference to be
performed in batches. This would be incompatible with the
current SentiNet setup, as for each input SentiNet will require
100 additional inputs during each fuzzing phase. Performing
parallel analysis is theoretically possible, but will require 100x
the amount of memory a regular inference scheme is current
using. It is worth noting that many other detection schemes
introduce significant overhead as well, and a small benefit
of the SentiNet approach is its plug and play compatibility,
only requiring a pre-computed run of small subset of clean
samples.
VI. RELATED WORK
We now review works closely related to this paper. First, we
explore the domain of attacks against neural networks. Then,
we expand on prior works on physical attacks. Finally, we
review proposed approaches to detect attacks against neural
networks.
Neural Network Attacks—The literature on adversarial at-
tacks on neural networks is vast and still growing. Szegedy et
al. [43] first demonstrated how adversarial noise can be used
to fool neural network classifiers by adding small gradient
perturbations to an image that is imperceptible to humans.
Numerous works have built on this approach; some notable
works include the Fast Gradient Sign Method [18], Deep-
Fool [35], and Universal Adversarial Perturbations [34]. This
area of research can be categorized as a cat-and-mouse game
in recent years, where defenses are created for new attacks
that bypass previous defenses [5] [6]. Additionally, adversarial
attacks certainly are not limited to gradient-perturbation based
techniques; data poisoning can be used to cause misintended
model behaviors [39], and compromised hardware can also
be used to insert trojans during the network inference proce-
dure [9]. Akhtar et al. [1] provides a useful survey about the
current state of the adversarial deep learning field.
Physical Attacks—Multiple works have demonstrated phys-
ical attacks within a variety of classification settings and
attacker capabilities. Adversarial patches [4] are possibly the
most well-known physical attack. These attacks are generated
by performing back-propagation on the target class to calculate
gradient noise localized to a region of the image. A re-
lated attack—Localized and Visible Adversarial Noise [26]—
operates under a similar principle with smaller but less robust
attacks. Robust Physical-World Attacks on Deep Learning
Models [11] demonstrates how adversarial perturbations can
be disguised as graffiti stickers to fool traffic sign attacks.
Similarly, [40] uses perturbations placed on glasses to fool
facial classification models. Trojaned Neural Networks [30]
perform back-propagation on specifically chosen neurons in
the network rather than the target class. The generated triggers
are used to ”trojan” the model by performing slight fine-tuning
to guide the trigger outputs towards a specified class, making
sure that the triggers only cause misclassifications on trojaned
models. BadNets [20] targets traffic sign detection models by
inserting pre-chosen patterns into images with the target label,
poisoning the data before the training process.
Adversarial Attack Detection—Detection techniques for ad-
versarial attacks as a defensive measure have been proposed
by many researchers. Safetynets [31] is designed to detect
adversarial-noise based attacks and exploits the different ac-
tivations adversarial perturbations produce to train a SVM
classifier. Metzen et al. [22] use a similar approach by training
a modified target classification network to detect adversarial
perturbations. Feinman et al. [13] also trains a classifier to
detect adversarial perturbational inputs based on the neural
network features, while Gong et al. [17] introduces a clas-
sifier trained to detect adversarially-perturbed images. Mag-
net [32] trains a classifier on manifolds of normal examples
to detect adversarial perturbations without prior knowledge of
the attack. There are also some works designed at creating
defenses that do not require training. Grosse et al. [19] uses
statistical techniques to distinguish adversarial-perturbations
outputs, while Hendrycks et al. [23] uses PCA to visualize
differences in perturbed images. A survey by Yuan et al. [47]
covers further detection defenses. All these works are only
aimed at defending against adversarial perturbations whereas
SentiNet can defend a network against other types of attacks,
i.e., data poisoning and trojaning attacks.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we introduce SentiNet, an attack agnostic
framework for detecting physical attacks on Convolutional
Neural Networks. Our method is notable because it only
relies on the malicious behavior of an adversarial attack to
perform classifications, without requiring prior knowledge of
the deployment or mechanisms of an attack. We demon-
strate the effectiveness SentiNet on three experiments with
fundamentally different attack mechanisms; a data poisoning
attack, a network trojaning attack, and a white-box adversarial
attack. We also the robustness of SentiNet against strong
adaptive adversaries by individually testing each component
of our defense. Our approach can be run in real-time in many
scenarios, and is flexible and easy to deploy.
There are further improvements that would help improve
the performance of SentiNet. Better visualization techniques
(see, e.g., Grad-CAM++ [8]) would improve the heatmap
quality to create better masks. Deep learning interpretability
and visualization is a challenging problem and breakthroughs
in this area can also allow us to further reason about whether
an attack is taking place. Furthermore, our anomaly detection
approach can be further extended to take advantage of the
richer data provided by the neuron outputs during the inference
process. Works have shown techniques to detect anomalous
high dimensional data using one class neural networks (see,
e.g., [7], [16]) which could enhance our current framework.
We hope SentiNet inspires further approaches towards cre-
ating attack-agnostic defenses. Tailoring a defense towards a
specific attack means unknown attacks cannot be captured, and
also makes the system highly vulnerable to strong adaptive
adversaries. We believe a similar approach can be used to
detect other adversarial attacks by leveraging the same core
concepts of identifying an attack from a model’s weakness.
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